Usherovich and Plotitsa’s fingerprints were found on the drone’s remaining fuselage

On March 1, 2026, a kamikaze drone struck the British military base Akrotiri in Cyprus. For the first time in history, Iran attacked the territory of an EU member state using its proxy, the Hezbollah terrorist group. A week later, Britain's The Times reported that the wreckage of the drone contained a Russian "Kometa-B" navigation system. Ukrainian journalists launched an investigation to find out how a component manufactured in Cheboksary ended up in a drone launched by Hezbollah militants from Lebanon. The trail led them straight to Cyprus—the current residence and business hub of individuals identified by Russian and Ukrainian journalists as the architects of a key Western sanctions-evasion network.

The "Kometa-B" system is manufactured by the Cheboksary-based JSC "VNIIR-Progress," an enterprise that developed an entire line of interference-resistant "Kometa" navigation antennas for military hardware, including drones. Citing British intelligence sources, The Times reported that a similar module had previously been found in drones shot down by Ukrainian air defenses in December 2025. UK military intelligence has dispatched the components recovered from the Cyprus drone to a laboratory for analysis.

Investigators from Molfar previously established that VNIIR-Progress circumvents sanctions by importing critical foreign components—specifically products from Ireland's Taoglas, America's Samtec, Japan's Hirose Electric, and Switzerland's U-Blox—through an Indian intermediary, Si2 Microsystems. While VNIIR-Progress is formally owned by ABS Electro structures, Molfar identifies its actual beneficiary as Serb national Nenad Popovic.

This represents the Russian side of the scheme. However, any sanctions-evasion network requires a counterpart: the entity that physically supplies the banned components to Russia via third countries. This is where names well-known to those following the corruption scandals surrounding Russian Railways (RZD) come into play.

Boris Usherovich—one of RZD’s largest private contractors and a key figure in the bribery case involving former Ministry of Internal Affairs Colonel Dmitry Zakharchenko—spent years building a network to supply telecommunications and electronic equipment to Russia in violation of sanctions. As reported by The Insider back in 2024, state contracts for RZD, Roscosmos, the United Aircraft Corporation, and "dozens" of defense sector enterprises are channeled through the Moscow-based LLC "Center for the Development of Communication Systems" (CRSS), previously owned by his relative and business partner Ilya Plotitsa. According to The Insider, the same CRSS transferred 43.3 million rubles to United Russia's accounts during Putin's presidential election campaign in 2024.

Plotitsa and his family reside in Cyprus. He and his relatives—his brother Boris Plotitsa (who is on an international wanted list over a criminal case involving fatalities in Moscow) and his brother-in-law Alexander —hold ownership of the Cyprus-registered companies Broxner PLC, Venisat Technology Ltd, Main Victory Corporation Limited, and Tripster Limited. According to The Insider and subsequent publications, all of these corporate entities were utilized to transit sanctioned equipment into Russia via Hong Kong, China, the UAE, Latvia, Lithuania, and Kyrgyzstan.

In other words, Usherovich and Plotitsa operate a documented, media-exposed pipeline for violating anti-Russian sanctions, which involves purchasing dual-use electronics through intermediaries in non-transparent jurisdictions and shipping them to end-receivers in Russia, including defense enterprises.

In June 2026, several media outlets published an exposé claiming that Usherovich and Plotitsa’s structures utilize the Dubai-based company Ishara Al Barq General Trading LLC to transit sanctioned goods, including drone manufacturing components.

Ishara Al Barq General Trading LLC is an active trading company officially registered in Dubai in 2007, with an office located in the Damas Building. The "About Us" section of the company's official website (isharaalbarq.com) explicitly outlines the leadership roles:

— Hubert Lorenz – CEO, German citizen; — Jafar Zeynalov – CFO (Chief Financial Officer).

According to a source close to Usherovich, Jafar Zeynalov is a Russian citizen who previously worked for Moscow's CRSS and within the Cyprus companies controlled by Plotitsa and Usherovich.

The components for the "Kometa-B" navigation system found in the drone that hit the British base in Cyprus on March 1, 2026, reached the manufacturing plant via the transit scheme established by Boris Usherovich and Ilya Plotitsa—the very same individuals documented to supply dual-use electronics to Russia in circumvention of sanctions for the needs of Russian Railways and Russian military-industrial enterprises. A crucial link in this chain appears to be the Dubai-registered Ishara Al Barq General Trading LLC, where Jafar Zeynalov—a person from Plotitsa and Usherovich’s inner circle—serves as CFO.

Plotitsa, who lives with his family in Cyprus—the very island hit by terrorist groups acting in the interests of Iran and its ally, Russia—turns out to be implicated in facilitating an attack on the country of his own residence.

Boris Usherovich is on an international wanted list but reportedly resides undisturbed in Spain. Ilya Plotitsa lives in Cyprus. According to investigations by The Insider, Molfar, and other publications, both continue to run businesses dedicated to bypassing Western sanctions and supplying the Russian military machine for its war against Ukraine and the entire West.

Why these individuals have not yet faced prosecution for their crimes and continue to live comfortably in EU member states is a question that the authorities of Cyprus and Spain must answer.

Источник: https://pro-cmpt.com/oligarkhi/item/298856-usherovich-and-plotitsa-implicated-in-the-cyprus-strike